The idea of an “Islamic NATO” is far from new. As early as 2015, the Arab League approved an initiative submitted by Egypt at one of its conferences – but it has yet to be realised.

The Arab League was founded on 22 March 1945 in Cairo – predating the United Nations – making it one of the world’s oldest regional state organisations.

The Islamic world is neither a monolithic bloc nor merely a stage for hopeless, endless internal disputes, but simply an extremely unstable one. To borrow the words of Carl Schmitt: foreign intervention alone is no more sufficient an explanation for this instability than blaming it entirely on internal difficulties – according to the nius.de news site.

This vast region’s Muslim states share many common traits. One of these is the handling of Western influence and a legacy of historical subservience. In the countries bordering, more or less, the Mediterranean, the past century has seen the emergence of a stronger Arab national character, often shaped by Cold War logic and imbued with socialist-militarist currents.

During this period, prompted by both influences, a more pronounced trend of secularisation has appeared – often producing domestic political opposition to Muslim orthodoxy (Egypt, Syria and others).

The conflicts playing out further east in the Gulf region – most notably the traditional hostility between Saudi Arabia and Iran – tend to follow the pattern of the age-old caliphate rivalries. Added to this are ethnic tensions among groups such as Turks, Kurds and Iraqis, tensions that many quietly acknowledge as a consequence of the borders drawn up by the League of Nations.

Die „islamische NATO“ ist ein nur am Rande der Berichterstattung gefallenes Schlagwort der letzten Wochen. Es sollte uns aber interessieren, nicht nur deshalb, weil dieser Region ein Großteil der hiesigen Migranten entstammt. https://t.co/DPdIBLDnyW pic.twitter.com/DpqTbbOqYf

— NIUS (@niusde_) September 23, 2025

In the Levant, the inclination towards forming alliances has historically been, and remains in practice, somewhat stronger. In principle, one may say that pan-Arabism and the impulse to coalition-building tend to originate here, whereas the Saudis and Iranians prefer to preserve their independence as regional power centres, relying on global rather than neighbouring allies.

On the question of Israel, however, there is significant consensus. The very existence of the Jewish state is not merely a favourite talking point for the Arab League but is regarded, despite many differences, as a foreign body in various ways. Rejection has historically ranged from rhetorical hostility within quiet cooperation to open enmity and even attempts to annihilate the Jewish state.

Solidarity with the later-formed Palestinian national identity follows the logic of this underlying sense of „alienness,” rather than the other way round. Supporting this thesis is the fact that the intermittent peace processes, a sober habituation to reality, and Israel’s proven resilience in both economic and political spheres have recently even led to agreements such as the “Abraham Accords.”

Thus, until only a few years ago, the Islamic states – despite their fundamental rejection – could be divided into two camps: those able to reach some form of understanding with Israel (Riyadh) and those who played the card of fundamentalist opposition (Tehran).

Israel’s struggle for survival and its intention to assert its interests – which, at times, even commanded a degree of respect in Egypt and Saudi Arabia– is perceived as a threat to national interests.

Egypt, one of the states with which Israel maintains a relatively stable working relationship, is mobilising in the Sinai Peninsula – not least out of fear that a flood of Palestinian refugees could destabilise its own country. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, cannot maintain its hegemony in the Persian Gulf, if it tolerates any extraterritorial meddling in the affairs of its allied emirates.

At the same time, global dynamics are also shifting. The United States has withdrawn from Afghanistan and is gradually pulling out of Iraq. The Abraham Accords were effectively meant to prepare the region for this withdrawal, turning the Saudis and neighbouring emirates into custodians of a regional order in which Washington relies on diplomacy and conducts only occasional military strikes. Its unquestionable, domestically motivated commitment to Israel was meant to be complemented by broader engagement with neighbouring states. Beijing, however, interpreted this changed situation as an invitation.

Saudi Arabia and Iran have been engaged for about two years in a rapprochement process initiated by Beijing. The two countries’ rivalry that peaked in 2016 – and still looms large in many readers’ minds – has since been steadily receding along these lines. This development coincides with a gradual role reversal on the Indian subcontinent, where the traditional positions of rival Pakistan and India towards China and the United States are shifting.

This marks a decisive step on the road to an “Islamic NATO.”

Last week, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a defence agreement whose central clause in effect mirrors NATO’s famous logic: any future attack on one of them must be considered an attack on both.

European politics, meanwhile, reveals a striking degree of geostrategic incompetence. The decades-long European criticism of the United States has now culminated in a situation where the US withdrawal is leading to unprecedented unity among the Islamic states of the Middle East – with China joining them. Whatever new order emerges in the region stretching from Morocco to Pakistan will have very little to do with the European Union’s interests.

Several European nations, most recently the British Labour government under Prime Minister Starmer, have announced their recognition of Palestine as a state.

Even without detailed analysis, it is unfortunate that such recognition – an immensely powerful instrument, not least because France and Britain are economically strong powers with permanent UN veto rights – should be granted without any concessions or plans,

– nius.de highlights.